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NONPARAMETRIC COUNTERFACTUALS IN RANDOM UTILITY MODELS
YUICHI KITAMURA∗ AND JO¨RG STOYE∗∗
Abstract. We bound features of counterfactual choices in the nonparametric random utility model
of demand (Kitamura and Stoye 2018), i.e. if observable choices are repeated cross-sections and
one allows for unrestricted, unobserved heterogeneity. In this setting, tight bounds are developed
on counterfactual discrete choice probabilities and on the expectation and c.d.f. of (functionals of)
counterfactual stochastic demand.
1. Introduction
Consider the random utility model of demand analyzed in McFadden and Richter (1991),
McFadden (2005), and Kitamura and Stoye (2018): Repeated cross-sections of demand are observed
on a finite sequence of budgets; the maintained assumption is that these cross-sections are of a
population of individually rational (in the sense of maximizing utility) individuals; however, one does
not substantively restrict utility functions nor their distribution, that is, one allows for unrestricted
and possibly infinite dimensional unobserved heterogeneity.
McFadden (2005) characterizes the empirical content of this model in population. We build
on his results to provide tight bounds on the distribution of counterfactual demand, i.e. of stochastic
demand on as yet unobserved budgets, as well as explicit bounds on the expectation and c.d.f. of
linear functions of demand vectors, e.g. demand for a specific good. Many of these bounds turn out
to be the values of linear programs, hence are easy to compute even in moderately high dimensional
applications.1 We next describe the setup and recall an important characterization of stochastic
rationalizability, then provide the bounds, and close by mentioning some extensions.
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1Some of these results were reported in section 9.2 of Kitamura and Stoye (2013) and implemented at the time. We
make them available not least because other work already built on them (Adams 2019, Manski 2014). Code is available
from the authors. See also Adams (2019), Hubner (2019), and Smeulders (2018) for recent results on computational
implementation.
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2. Stochastic Rationalizability
We use notation from Kitamura and Stoye (2018). There are J observed budgets {Bj}Jj=1, J ∈
N, each characterized by price vectors pj ∈ RK+ , where expenditure is normalized to 1:
Bj ≡ {y ∈ RK+ : p′jy = 1}, j = 1, ..., J.
Suppose that we know a stochastic demand system
Pj(x) ≡ Pr(y(pj) ∈ x), x ⊂ RK+
for j = 1, . . . , J , where the random variable y(pj) is demand on budget Bj . This collection of dis-
tributions is rationalizable by a random utility model if there exists a distribution Pu over locally
nonsatiated (for simplicity) utility functions u : RK+ 7→ R s.t.
Pj(x) =
∫
1
{
argmax
y∈RK+ :p′jy=1
u(y) ∈ x
}
dPu, x ⊆ Bj , j = 1, ..., J.
Our motivation is demand estimation from repeated cross-section with unobserved heterogene-
ity, but the model has also been used to describe choices made by an individual with random utility.
We next recall a succinct description of its empirical content.
Let X ≡ {x1, ..., xI} be the coarsest partition of ∪Jj=1Bj such that for any i ∈ {1, ..., I} and
j ∈ {1, ..., J}, xi is either completely on, completely strictly above, or completely strictly below
budget plane Bj . Equivalently, any y1, y2 ∈ ∪Jj=1Bj are in the same element of the partition iff
sg(p′jy1 − 1) = sg(p′jy2 − 1) for all j = 1, ..., J . Elements of X will be called patches. Each budget
can be uniquely expressed as union of patches; the number of patches that jointly comprise budget
Bj will be called Ij . For future reference, we emphasize that any patch is the intersection of finitely
many open or closed half spaces and therefore its closure (though not necessarily the patch itself) is
a finite polytope.
An important insight of the aforecited papers is that stochastic rationalizability constrains
the aggregate choice probabilities of patches, but not at all the distribution of demand on any
patch. Intuitively, this is because all choices that are on the same patch generate the same revealed
preference information. Formally, let the vector representation of (B1, . . . ,BJ) be the
(∑J
j=1 Ij
)
-
vector (x1|1, . . . , xI1|1, x1|2, . . . , xIJ |J), where (x1|j , . . . , xIj |j) lists all patches comprising Bj in arbitrary
but henceforth fixed order.2 Let the vector representation of (P1, . . . , PJ) be the
(∑J
j=1 Ij
)
-vector
2Note that elements of X that appear as components of distinct budgets make corresponding repeat appearances,
under different labels, in the vector representation.
3pi ≡ (pi1|1, . . . , piI1|1, pi1|2, . . . , piIJ |J), where pii|j ≡ Pj(xi|j). Next, note that any rationalizable non-
stochastic demand system can be thought of as a degenerate stochastic demand system with binary
vector representation. A stochastic demand system is rationalizable iff it is a mixture of such rational-
izable nonstochastic demand systems because the latter can be thought of as representing choice types
in the population. But due to the discretization of the choice universe into patches, there are only
finitely many such types. Collect their vector representations in the H < ∞ columns of the rational
demand matrix A: see Kitamura and Stoye (2018) (in particular Definition 3.5 and discussions in
Sections 3.2 - 3.4). Then we have:3
Theorem 1. The stochastic demand system (P1, . . . , PJ) is rationalizable if, and only if, its vector
representation pi fulfills pi = Aν for some ν ∈ ∆H−1. Here, ∆H−1 is the unit simplex in RH .
3. Bounds on Counterfactuals
We next take a rationalizable stochastic demand system (P1, . . . , PJ) as given and ask what
discipline it places on
y(p0) := argmax
y∈RK+ :p′0y=1
u(y), u ∼ Pu,
the stochastic demand at some counterfactual budget B0 corresponding to counterfactual price p0.4
As with nonstochastic demand, this discipline will typically take the form of bounds, although these
are now on a distribution. They are tightly related to testing rationalizability because a distribution
P0 of demands on B0 is inside the bounds iff (P0, ..., PJ) are jointly rationalizable; thus, Theorem 1
implies an exact characterization of bounds on P0 implied by knowledge of (P1, ..., PJ). We will now
formally state this characterization.
Recall that the matrix A in Theorem 1 is obtained for the set of observed budgets (B1, ...,BJ).
We can apply the same algorithm to the augmented set of budgets (B0,B1, ...,BJ) to obtain patches
on it and its vector representations: for completeness we write them
(3.1) (x∗1|0, ..., x
∗
I∗0 |0, x
∗
1|1, ..., x
∗
I∗J |J).
3The statement follows Kitamura and Stoye (2018), who also prove it, provide algorithms for computing A, and point
out that ν ∈ ∆H−1 can be conveniently weakened to ν ≥ 0. However, the discretization step is clearly anticipated in
McFadden (2005), and the result was otherwise proved in McFadden and Richter (1991). See also Stoye (2019).
4For the very special case of K = 2, Hoderlein and Stoye (2015) provide closed-form bounds. Blundell, Browning,
and Crawford (2008) and many others provide bounds under slightly stronger, e.g. aggregation, assumptions.
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The patches for the original system (B1, ...,BJ) remain unchanged in the augmented system if they
do not intersect with B0. Therefore if Bj′ ∩ B0 = ∅ holds for some j′ ∈ {1, . . . , J}, then I∗j′ = Ij and
(x∗1|j′ , . . . , x
∗
I∗
j′ |j′
) = (x1|j′ , . . . , xIj′ |j′)
for such j′. Moreover we can apply the algorithm discussed in Section 2 to the augmented system
(B0, . . . ,BJ) to obtain its rational demand matrix A∗ ∈ R(
∑J+1
j=1 I
∗
j )×H∗ , where H∗ ≥ H. Note that
each row of A∗ corresponds to a patch in the new vector representation (3.1). Once A∗ is obtained,
we can define a probability vector ν∗ ∈ ∆H∗−1, now defined over the columns of A∗, and the choice
probability vector pi∗ for the patches {x∗1|0, ..., x∗I∗0 |0, x
∗
1|1, ..., x
∗
I∗J |J}. Note that the elements of pi
∗
corresponding to ∪Jj=1Bj are observed, while the rest remain unobserved: the latter are counterfactual
conditional probabilities. To make this point clear, we write
A∗ =
 A∗0
A∗1
 , pi∗ =
 pi∗0
pi∗1
 ,
where A∗0 collects rows of A∗ that correspond to patches that do not belong to ∪Jj=1Bj , A∗1 collects all
other patches, and similarly for pi∗. It continues to be the case that pi∗ is rationalizable iff A∗ν∗ = pi∗
for some ν∗ ∈ ∆H∗−1. However, rather than taking pi∗ to be observed and testing rationalizability, we
take pi∗1 to be observed and pi∗0 to a vector of counterfactual probabilities to be accordingly constrained
by the observed pi∗1. Formally:
5
Theorem 2. A distribution P0 is consistent with observed demands (P1, ..., PJ) if, and only if, its
implied value of pi∗0 fulfils
A∗ν∗ =
 pi∗0
pi∗1

for some ν∗ ∈ ∆H∗−1. Here, pi∗1 takes the value implied by (P1, . . . , PJ). In particular, the conditional
distributions P0(·|y ∈ x∗i|0) (for all for all i = 1, . . . , I∗0 where this is defined) are not restricted.
We next explain how this result translates into extremely tractable, best possible bounds on
many parameters of interest. Specifically, we have:
5For a setting like ours except that the universal choice set is finite and “budgets” are subsets of it, Manski (2007)
anticipates Theorem 2. Our contribution lies in the connection to nonparametric demand, in laying the groundwork for
Theorem 3 and its corollaries, and in the accompanying computational as well as statistical machinery.
5Theorem 3. For any known function g : RK 7→ R that is bounded on B0, define
g
i|0 ≡ infy∈x∗
i|0
g(y), 1 ≤ i ≤ I∗0(3.2)
gi|0 ≡ sup
y∈x∗
i|0
g(y), 1 ≤ i ≤ I∗0 .(3.3)
Then the bounds
(3.4) min
{
(g
1|0, . . . , gI0|0)A
∗
0ν
∗ : A∗1ν
∗ = pi∗1, ν
∗ ∈ ∆H∗−1}
≤ Eg(y(p0)) ≤
max
{
(g1|0, . . . , gI0|0)A
∗
0ν
∗ : A∗1ν
∗ = pi∗1, ν
∗ ∈ ∆H∗−1}
are sharp, i.e. they cannot be improved upon without further information.
Proof. By the Law of Iterated Expectations,
Eg(y(p0)) =
I0∑
i=1
pi∗i|0E(g(y(p0))|y ∈ x∗i|0) = (g1|0, . . . , gI∗0 |0)pi∗0,(3.5)
where gi|0 ≡ E(g(y(p0))|y ∈ x∗i|0) if pi∗i|0 6= 0 and otherwise we assign it an arbitrary value. By
inspection of (3.2), (3.3), and (3.5), the upper and lower bounds are valid and can be approached
arbitrarily closely. Furthermore, if distributions P0 and Q0 are consistent with observable demands
(P1, . . . , PJ), then so is any mixture between them. Hence, all values strictly between the bounds are
attained by appropriate mixtures of distributions that approximate the bounds. 
The proof reveals not only that the bounds are sharp, but also that all intermediate values
of Eg(y(p0)) are necessarily attainable. Whether the bounds themselves are attainable depends on
whether patches are open or closed in the relevant directions and can only be decided on a case-by-case
basis.
Computing these bounds requires to solve the linear programs in (3.4) and, as an input, the
optimization problems in (3.2)-(3.3). The latter are tractable in relevant cases: If g is continuous, the
constraint sets can be taken to be the closures of patches, hence finite polytopes. If g is furthermore
linear, then computing the bounds requires only linear programming, though possibly with many
constraints.
We further elaborate this result by more explicitly bounding the expected value and c.d.f. of
z′y(p0), where z ∈ RK is a user-specified vector. For example, z = (1, 0, . . . , 0)′ extracts demand for
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good 1 and z = (p
[1]
0 , p
[2]
0 , 0, . . . , 0)
′ (i.e., the first two components of p0 followed by zeroes) extracts
joint expenditure on the first two goods. Theorem 3 then specializes as follows.
Corollary 1. Let
mi|0(z) ≡ inf{z′y : y ∈ x∗i|0}, 1 ≤ i ≤ I∗0
mi|0(z) ≡ sup{z′y : y ∈ x∗i|0}, 1 ≤ i ≤ I∗0 .
Then the bounds
min{(m1|0(z), . . . ,mI0|0(z))A∗0ν∗ : A∗1ν∗ = pi∗1, ν∗ ∈ ∆H
∗−1}
≤ E(z′y(p0)) ≤
max{(m1|0(z), . . . ,mI0|0(z))A∗0ν : A∗1ν∗ = pi∗1, ν∗ ∈ ∆H
∗−1}
are sharp.
We note that computation of these bounds only requires linear programming. Next, we bound
probabilities of arbitrary events and hence also c.d.f.’s.
Corollary 2. For fixed event x ⊆ B0, the bounds
min
{ ∑
i∈{1,...,I∗0 }:
x∗
i|0⊆x
e′iA
∗
0ν : A
∗
1ν
∗ = pi∗1, ν
∗ ∈ ∆H∗−1
}
≤ Pr(y(p0) ∈ x) ≤
max
{ ∑
i∈{1,...,I∗0 }:
x∗
i|0∩x 6=∅
e′iA
∗
0ν : A
∗
1ν
∗ = pi∗1, ν
∗ ∈ ∆H∗−1
}
are sharp. Here, ei is the i’th canonical basis vector in R
I∗0 .
For fixed vector z ∈ RK , let
p
i|0(z, t) ≡ 1{mi|0(z) ≤ t}
pi|0(z, t) ≡ 1{x∗i|0 ∩ {z′y = t} 6= ∅},
7noting that mi|0(z) < t ⇒ pi|0(z, t) = 1 and mi|0(z) > t ⇒ pi|0(z, t) = 0. Then the following bounds
on the c.d.f. of z′y(p0) are sharp:
min
{
(p
1|0(z, t), . . . , pI∗0 |0
(z, t))A∗0ν
∗ : A∗1ν
∗ = pi∗1, ν
∗ ∈ ∆H∗−1}
≤ Pr(z′y(p0) ≤ t) ≤
max
{
(p1|0(z, t), . . . , pI∗0 |0(z, t))A
∗
0ν
∗ : A∗1ν
∗ = pi∗1, ν
∗ ∈ ∆H∗−1}.
The bounds on the c.d.f. require essentially only linear programming, with a minimal additional
check in the finitely many cases where mi|0(z) = t.6 They are pointwise but not uniform in t;
in particular, their upper and lower envelopes do not necessarily describe feasible counterfactual
distributions.7 Therefore, while the upper and lower envelopes induce bounds on a multitude of more
complicated parameters (Stoye 2010), those bounds are not in general tight.
4. Concluding Remarks
We conclude by mentioning some connections and extensions.
First, we considered the case of one counterfactual budget for expositional clarity. Bounds on
the joint c.d.f. of demand on two counterfactual budgets, or on some linear combination of expected
values, are straightforward extensions of the above results. In general, they can be considerably tighter
than the Cartesian product of budget-by-budget bounds and also need not include the budget-by-
budget minimum and maximum bound. For the case of a single (possibly fictitious, e.g. representative)
nonstochastic utility maximizer, see Adams (2019) for a much more extensive analysis in this spirit.
Next, these results naturally extend to finite discrete choice settings, i.e. if choices from distinct
subsets C1, . . . , CJ of a finite choice universe X (the duplication of notation is intended) were observed
and choices from another such subset C0 are to be predicted. In this case, the finitely many elements of
X directly play the role of patches, the conditional distributions on patches are trivial, and Theorem
2 characterizes those p.m.f.’s of counterfactual random choice that are consistent with observed choice
distributions. That said, the analysis in Manski (2007) anticipates Theorem 2 in this setting. Of
course, the result also applies to the further specialization where all observed choice sets are binary,
as in the “linear polytope” literature in mathematical psychology (Fishburn 1992).
Finally, we developed population-level bounds but ignored estimation and inference. To handle
this, note that if one takes (p0, . . . , pJ) and therefore A
∗ to be known, then all the above bounds
6This case occurs when {z′y = t} is a lower supporting hyperplane of patch xi|0 but does not intersect it.
7Indeed, they may not even be c.d.f.’s for lack of right-continuity, though they can always be approximated by c.d.f.’s.
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maximize or minimize γA∗0ν∗ for some known vector γ; it is only pi∗1 that must be estimated. This
is essentially the estimation and inference problem analyzed in Section 4.2 of Deb, Kitamura, Quah,
and Stoye (2018).
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